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MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES AND THE PROTEUS 
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ENVIRONMENTS. A WITTGENSTEINIAN 
VIEWPOINT
by
STEFANO CAVAGNETTO & BRUCE GAHIR*
What does it mean to be you? How drastically can a person change and still re-
main, in the eyes of either themselves or their peers, the same person? Until re-
cently, these questions were typically asked in the context of philosophy, psycho-
analysis, or science fiction. However, the increasingly common use of avatars dur-
ing  computer-mediated  communication,  collaborative  virtual  environments  
(CVE' s)  in  particular,  are  quickly changing these  once  abstract  questions into  
practical quandaries that are fascinating, thought-provoking, potentially paradigm  
shifting for those who study social interaction, and potentially devastating to the  
traditional concept of human communication. Given the advent of collaborative vir-
tual reality (CVR) technology, researchers have begun to systematically explore the  
phenomena of Transformed Social Interaction (TSI)1.
The Proteus effect is a particular application of TSI in which a user's self-rep-
resentation is modified in a meaningful way that is often dissimilar to the physical  
self. When the user then interacts with another person, the user's behaviour con-
forms to the modified self-representation regardless of the true physical self or the  
others  impressions.2 In  an  earlier  introductory  paper3 we  detailed  a  conceptual  
framework that illustrated the idea of the self as composed of information in mul-
tiple cyberworlds,  this tentative  framework was utilised to explain a “layering”  
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feedback process that may occur as a result of the self interacting in a CVE, in addi-
tion we expanded this framework to integrate an anthropological viewpoint of the  
self.
In this paper our intention is to provide further understanding of the relation-
ship between the Proteus effects and the conceptual model of multiple virtual per-
sonalities interacting in CVE using the Wittgensteinian language games frame-
work, we expand our earlier paper to suggest that the notions of a “virtual person-
ality” and “virtual game grammar” may hopefully bring a refreshing approach to  
examining the Proteus effect.
KEYWORDS
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1. THE PROTEUS EFFECT AND COLLABORATIVE VIRTUAL 
ENVIRONMENTS
When people play video games and interact in virtual environments, they 
adopt social stereotypes and roles (e.g. soldier, doctor, mafioso, wizard) and 
interact in situations that go beyond real life  (Shapiro, Pena, & Hancock, 
2006),  people  “become”  someone  else  by  employing  digital  bodies  or 
avatars that serve as users' self-representation in a virtual setting.4 In doing 
so, does our cognition change in relationship to our virtual persona? And if 
so, what mechanisms underlie the influence of avatars on users cognition?
In such virtual environments, an avatar is defined as “a perceptible digit-
al  representation whose behaviour reflects  what  is  executed,  typically  in 
real time, by a specific human being”.5 CVE's encompass both digital envir-
onments created for communication applications as well as online games 
created for entertainment purposes. 
CVE's allow us to tailor our digital self-representation with a degree of 
control not possible elsewhere. This encompasses both visual and behavi-
oural changes. First of all, CVE's, provide us with a great deal of control 
over our self-representation. Everything from our age, gender, ethnicity, or 
height  can be  dramatically  altered or  subtly  tweaked with  a few mouse 
clicks. Analogous changes to our physical bodies are much more difficult 
(or impossible) to accomplish. Because digital systems mediate all interac-
4 Eastin, 2006; Yee & Bailenson, 2007
5 Bailenson & Blascovich, 2004, p. 65
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tions in a CVE, the digital system can also be programmed to strategically 
filter and alter our behaviours. This has been referred to as Transformed So-
cial Interaction (TSI).6
Research in CVE's7 has shown how the technical affordances of these en-
vironments can lead to more intimate interactions. For example, studies in 
TSI have shown how strategic changes in an avatar's appearance or beha-
viour can affect how other users interact with that avatar. The current work 
of Yee and Bailenson8 has explored an interesting variation of this effect. In-
stead of exploring how an avatar's appearance can change how other people 
behave,  they were interested instead  in  how an avatar's  appearance  can 
change the user's own behaviour, the Proteus effect.
Studies in self-perception have shown that altered self-representations 
can directly lead to changes in a person's behaviour but they do not provide 
us with a theoretical mechanism for explaining why this change might oc-
cur. Self-perception theory argues that people infer their own attitudes and 
beliefs from observing themselves as if from a third party9. 
In addition to observations of one's own behaviour, several studies have 
demonstrated  that  observations  of  one's  own  appearance  can  lead  to 
changes in behaviour. Frank and Gilovich's paper10 on the effect of wearing 
black  uniforms  best  illustrates  the  causal  chain  underlying  this  process. 
They were interested in whether wearing black uniforms caused athletes to 
behave more aggressively.  In  their  paper,  Frank and Gilovich  explained 
their  findings with direct  application of Bem's self-perception theory,  ar-
guing that participants in black uniforms observe themselves as if from a 
third-party to infer their expected attitudes and behaviour. This effect has 
also been replicated in a digital game-like setting, where users given avatars 
in a black robe expressed a higher desire to commit anti-social behaviour 
than users given avatars in a white robe.11 The self-perception effect has also 
been shown to lead to behavioural changes more directly (rather than just  
simply a desire to behave in a certain way). 
6 Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004
7 Walther, 1996
8 Yee and Bailenson, 2007
9 Bem, 1972
10 Frank and Gilovich, 1988
11 Merola, Penas, & Hancock, 2006
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Furthermore, experimental studies have demonstrated the Proteus Effect 
in immersive virtual reality.12 In a series of two studies, it was found that 
the attractiveness or height of participants' avatars had a significant impact 
on how they interacted with a confederate and these studies show that even 
small changes to our avatars can lead to immediate and significant changes 
in how we behave and interact with other people in a virtual environment.
Thus in general, we may expect users to make inferences about their ex-
pected dispositions from their avatar's appearance and then conform to the 
expected attitudes and behaviour,  the Proteus effect.13 So far,  the experi-
mental studies we have referred to 3 above have been suggestive, but have 
not provided a specific framework that might explain how an avatar could 
directly change a user's behaviour. Self-perception theory offers a tentative 
framework to explain some of the above findings; in the next section we 
propose a Wittgensteinian language games framework for collaborative vir-
tual environments, we introduce new concepts that may assist us to view 
the Proteus effect from a different point of view. We begin by introducing 
the concept of Wittgenstein's language games and the “grammar” of lan-
guage.
2. WITTGENSTEIN’S LANGUAGE GAMES AND 
COLLABORATIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
Through his articulation of language and its practice as a type of game, Wit-
tgenstein has been both adopted and critiqued for purposes of circumscrib-
ing what are now commonly held as the necessary constituents of games in-
cluding their systemic nature and the acquiescence of their participants to 
an agreed-upon rule structure: a set of rules which Wittgenstein likens to 
the “grammar” of language. However, the relatively recent consideration of 
Wittgenstein's work as a contributor of modern game theory and its applic-
ation to virtual environments is at very least intriguing given that it was 
Wittgenstein who originally turned to games as a model for the dynamics,  
boundaries and rule-based activities of language. 
The first Wittgenstein, in the earlier philosophy of the Tractatus (TPL) 
(1961) thought language as a picture of the world. In the Philosophical In-
vestigations  (PI)  (2001),  this  view  was  repudiated  and  language,  as  a 
concept, came to be seen as something which cannot be defined. Language 
12 Yee & Bailenson, 2007
13 Yee & Bailenson, 2007
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was no longer thought to be a simple product but came to be viewed as a 
complex process. The main change consists in the shift from the conceptual 
approach in which the logical form (or structure) of the language tends to 
reflect, in a pictorial manner, the real world, to the view of the language as 
an activity, as a complex process which comes and develops as a part of nat-
ural history. 
The word “language” is not the name of a single phenomenon but it is 
the name of the class of an indefinite number of “language games”. Wit-
tgenstein's analogy compares a language and an ancient city: Our language 
can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and 
new houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by 
a multitude  of  new  boroughs  with  straight  regular  streets  and  uniform 
houses. (PI§17)
Language games are therefore all activities in the language that we un-
derstand, expressions of our “form of life” (PI§18) because as Wittgenstein 
states,  “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life”  (PI§18).  
A language game is a whole “consisting of language and the actions into 
which it is woven.” (PI§19). A language game cannot be understood outside 
the context  into  which  the language is  woven.  The total  environment in 
which the language is used is part of the language game. If, in any given 
language, one cannot ask questions, give orders, describe things, or make 
requests, then these activities do not exist there. That is what seems to be 
meant by saying that language games are expressions of a “form of life”.  
The  study  of  language  games  means  the  study  of  the  use  of  language 
against the background and within the context of a “form of life”.
Understanding language on the model of  games,  Wittgenstein asserts 
that games, like languages, are rule-based modes of practice that are to be 
considered part of their own “form of life” (PI§16). This is not to say that 
“form of life” is a designation exclusive to games or even languages, but ac-
knowledging  games  as  being  embedded  within  “forms  of  life”  is  un-
doubtedly the first step in using Wittgenstein's concept of language games 
as a means to conceptually examine “virtual game play”. Wittgenstein's de-
tailing of language games and forms of life supports the idea that a lan-
guage game, itself, is not only a culmination of words and utterances, but a  
meaningful activity, a practice that intones a particular organic quality and 
which is ontologically rooted in the dynamism of those participating. It is 
an activity capable of changing, evolving and growing through it very con-
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duct. A nebulous and yet fundamental concept, “forms of life” to Wittgen-
stein is what enables language games to function as they do: it is the fertile 
soil that allows the growth and development of language games and acts as 
the basis  from which language grows and develops.  It is  the underlying 
foundation  for  human  understanding  and  meaningful  exchanges  within 
particular  conditions and cultural  contexts and thus for language games, 
themselves.
Wittgenstein aims  to make it  clear  that  the term “language game” is 
meant to bring into prominence that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a “form of life”, it is the “whole consisting of language and 
the actions into which it is woven” (PI§13). It is salient to note that language 
games  are  embedded within  forms  of  life:  that  is  to  say  that,  language 
games are something that occur within a particular form of life. Hence, “vir-
tual game play” may be considered part of the forms of life of “play”, or 
“commerce”, or “cultural recreation”: the boundaries between forms of life 
and language games, in particular, are innately blurred over one another. 
Language games are “active” and are made comprehensible by the form of 
life in which they are nested. In a similar manner, virtual game play may 
also be considered as “active” being nested in a form of life and being con-
stantly protean and culturally situated phenomena rooted in action and in 
practice. 
It is language and its meanings that serve as the supporting pillar of our 
own epistemologies and as a result, language can cement a given epistemo-
logy and paradigms within it through the adoption and use of its conven-
tions. Wittgenstein cites the example of philosophy, itself,  noting that the 
reason we are “still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were 
the Greeks...[is] because our language has remained the same and keeps se-
ducing us into asking the same questions” (PI§20) However, before apply-
ing  Wittgenstein  to  a  conceptual  understanding  of  virtual  game play,  it 
must be clarified as to what we mean by “virtual game play”.
3. “VIRTUAL GAMES” IN SEMIOTIC DOMAINS
With a certain sense of understanding concerning Wittgenstein's language 
games in tow, outlining what constitutes “virtual game play” is crucial to 
the understanding of some of the ideas presented in this paper. What can 
we learn by mobilizing Wittgenstein's “language games” approach as a way 
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to interrogate virtual game play and the intentional structuring of virtual 
games themselves? 
At first glance, as with many other processes, activities and rituals, virtu-
al  game play  has  its  own language,  its  own terminologies,  its  own dis-
courses, its own way of addressing phenomena within the “space” of the 
game, within a genre and within a method of development (i.e. program-
ming tools).  There are also the languages of play within a “virtual com-
munity”, the manipulation and exchange of formal language transformed 
into action, the following of rules, and the abidance of etiquette, colloquial  
banter and the development of terminology. All of these things are situated 
within, even as they situate the very act of play within a virtual environ-
ment; they are the languages and the activities constitutive of the language 
game of “virtual game play”. The idea of looking at the way how language 
shapes the way we speak and ask questions within any “form of life” as 
outlined in Wittgenstein's concept of language games already demonstrates 
a glimmer of relevance to virtual game design-but what is it that “virtual 
game players” are actually doing within the “space” of the game? To begin 
answering this question we need to focus initially on the “virtual space” 
wherein the dynamics of virtual play occurs.
James Paul Gee, asserts that when one engages in a virtual game, one 
partakes of a preconstructed semiotic space which comes with its own form 
of literacy.14 Semiotic domains, in Gee's own phrasing, are “any set of prac-
tices that recruits one or more modalities to communicate distinctive types 
of meanings” (2003, p. 18), or in the words of Jason Craft, “distinct and em-
bodied contexts, matrices of environmental attributes and, crucially, social 
practices in which signs are given a distinct meaning, and in which a person 
can be literate”. 
In other words, for both Gee and Craft, the playing of virtual games can 
be conceived as activity in semiotic domains. Gee outlines two particularly 
important aspects of semiotic domains. First, there is a literacy involved in 
the participation in a given domain, including the linguistic and practical 
conventions  and  knowledge  of  the  rules,  signs  and  meanings  of  those 
signs.15 Secondly, semiotic domains are designed spaces, and much like Wit-
tgenstein, Gee places great emphasis on the practice that has gone into the 
construction of and participation in semiotic domains. A semiotic domain 
14 Gee, 2003
15 Gee, 2001
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can denote the practice of anything from “baseball” to “stamp collecting” to 
“stock market investing” and although Gee would note that CVE's give ac-
cess to their own semiotic domains, these domains have the potential to be 
designed and laden with subject matter that carries with them their own set 
of  practices  and multiple  modalities.  Lloyd Rieber  argues that  these do-
mains, or “microworlds” as he terms them can be designed or changed.
Considering the semiotic domain of Baseball as an example, the in-do-
main objects such as the baseball, itself, carries with them specific meanings 
in the context of the game and each of them are the subject of multiple mod-
alities (i.e. hitting the ball with the bat to score points versus catching the 
ball off an opponent's hit before a bounce to gain an 'out'). Thus, the ball  
carries with it  different and potentially nuanced meanings depending on 
the modality assumed which vary by team position, individual in-game role 
etc..  Baseball  is  an example  of the  way domain  design  determines  what 
practices  are  crucial  to  functioning  within  them;  practices  which  sub-
sequently allow one to garner a literacy of that domain.16 Baseball is in these 
ways not so different  from the “virtual  game player's  language”. In this 
sense, we could adopt the phrase “virtual game player's grammar”, which 
could refer to the rules that organize elements in a “virtual game player's 
space”, a kind of virtual semiotic participation space that sets the standards 
and rules for participation in a particular virtual domain with the dynamics 
of the rules, degrees of freedom and the loopholes that support potentiality 
and possibility within a virtual language, virtual game grammar can there-
fore be thought of as serving the fundamental groundwork in the creation, 
negotiation and comprehensibility of virtual semiotic domains.
One could consider such virtual semiotic domains as virtual communit-
ies, according to semiotician Yuri Lotman, “every culture begins by divid-
ing the world into „its own  internal space and „their  external space”; this‟ ‟  
is the main function of the boundary, which he defines as “the outer limit of 
a first-person form”.17 Analogously, virtual communities delimit their semi-
otic space through the topics of interest, which can be expressed by some 
keywords that have the function of outlining the relevant field of commu-
nication of the community, i.e.  of establishing the topics members are al-
lowed to discuss about or the way players are supposed to play the virtual 
game. In other words, the virtual semiosphere defines the semiotic space 
16 Gee, 2003
17 Lotman 2001, p.131
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where interactions can occur and be meaningful for the life of a virtual gam-
ing community: it acts as a valve that controls the community's opening to-
wards the outside and its internal behaviour within the virtual semiosphere.
To aid our understanding of the virtual semiosphere, at this point, it is 
worth elaborating upon the notion of a virtual community, we begin first by 
shedding light on the issue of virtual identity, a pivotal concept, in CVE's. 
According to James Paul Gee, the relationship existing between the player 
and the play gives rise to three different identities:
1. The real person, i.e. the player's real world identity, which does not 
vanish when playing, but, on the contrary, affects the choices and the de-
cisions that are made during the play.
2. The virtual character, i.e. the identity the player assumes as a virtual 
character in the game's virtual world, which is usually represented by an 
avatar.
3. The projective identity, an intermediate identity that is a sort of bridge 
between the real person and the virtual character. As a matter of fact, the 
real person projects his/her real world identity on the virtual one, and on 
the other side the virtual identity lets emerge in the real person desires and 
aspirations concerning the virtual character18 developing what we term the 
“virtual personality”.
Following our earlier work19, we could model the above identities as in-
formation content contributing to the formation of a personality P(W) of the 
player in the real world W, what James Paul Gee has referred to as the real  
person. If we now assume C1 to represent a virtual gaming community, a 
semiosphere, then we could define P(C1) to represent the “altered” person-
ality of the player while being immersed in such a community, being re-
ferred to above as the virtual character. The feedback of certain information 
from activity in the cyberworld influencing the personality of the player, 
eventually leading to the Proteus effect, could be described as the projective 
identity; this is depicted in figure 1.
18 Gee 2004: 54-8
19 Cavagnetto & Gahir, 2009
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FIGURE 1: DEPICTING THE ANALOGY OF PERSONALITIES IN CYBERWORLDS 
AND JAMES PAUL GEE’S IDENTITIES
At the levels of the real person's and the virtual character's identities, 
two different virtual communities can be outlined:
1. The playing community, i.e. the community of the virtual charac-
ters, who interact in the game's world with other characters. 
2. The  players’  community,  i.e.  the  community  of  the  real  persons 
who interact  with  other  persons  who are  interested in  the  same 
game; these communities are very popular and active, and are func-
tional  to  the  game,  itself,  since  they  can  shape  and  modify  the 
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game's  environment,  by  building  new  objects,  new  spaces,  new 
game levels,  which can be integrated in  the virtual world of the 
game.
Thus, conduct within a language game can be conceived of as the craft-
ing and constant refining of virtual semiospheres that can be viewed as vir-
tual  communities  with their  respective  virtual  grammars.  What Wittgen-
stein  essentially  adds  to  our  own  conceptualization  of  a  “virtual  game 
player's  space”  is  the  epistemological  ramifications  of  the  “grammar  of 
play”. Being thoroughly entrenched in the language of a given virtual lan-
guage game is  to be bathed in the conventions,  accepted modalities  and 
ideologies that support a way of knowing and taking part in the virtual lan-
guage game, itself.
To this point we have found utility in using Wittgenstein to speak to the 
nature of virtual games and play: drawing parallels between language and 
games has served to delineate certain features about “virtual game play”, 
rules and consensual meaning established between participants in a given 
game. 
To recapitulate, virtual language games are an exchange between parti-
cipants which aid and assist in the development of the rules and grammars 
of  a  given  virtual  language  game,  building  up  an  epistemology  which 
shapes ways of describing things that convey similar  meanings to all  in-
volved parties. These meanings are embedded in the social practices of the 
virtual language game participants in VCE's and become adhered to those 
social practices much in the same way that Sutton-Smith's rhetoric of play 
become communally fastened to a particular  way of “knowing” play – a 
“knowing” which is also constructed through linguistic and rhetorical ex-
change  and  subsequent  praxis.  In  this  way,  our  application  of  Sut-
ton-Smith's notion of rhetoric and epistemologies of play to virtual semio-
spheres and Wittgenstein's approach to meaning and the epistemologies de-
rived from linguistic exchange exhibit a type of “family resemblance” to one 
another.
Further, we note that Wittgenstein's language games establish some no-
tions that have extremely important implications for the theory of signs,  
since language games can be understood as the shared conceptual paramet-
ers that make it possible to identify and produce signs, and to establish rela-
tions of signification and representation. Extending this conception to virtu-
al communities  and the Proteus effect,  one may consider  the avatar as a 
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kind of “virtual symbolic mask”, a kind of sign that establishes a “relation 
of significance” in the other player and in the user. We now introduce four 
independent notions that may assist us in further defining the landscape of 
the virtual semiosphere form a Wittgensteinian viewpoint:
1. Virtual language games (semiotic practices which, despite the term 
"language", are not restricted to verbal language) defining the char-
acteristic components that govern the virtual language game.
2. The  moves  of  the  virtual  language  games  (concrete  actions  per-
formed in a given language game, the raw data of semiotic theory).
3. The grammar of the virtual language games (the conceptual archi-
tecture that determines how the signs are used), the rules of the vir-
tual language game.
4. The “form of life” concept which is the cultural environment defin-
ing the boundaries of the virtual semiosphere in which the virtual 
language game occurs, the “virtual community”.
These four notions above may be thought of as playing a central role in 
the dynamics of virtual language games and our semiotic practices can be 
thought of as rule-guided practices.  We could therefore view the virtual 
game as a language game with a rule-guided way of attributing meaning to 
events, the value of having a different avatar in a virtual game could be de-
termined by the character this  avatar is  going to depict  and this  in  turn 
could be defined by a set of properties (Ap) such as height, hair colour, eye 
colour... the set of these properties could determine avatar appearance, we 
can denote this as the “symbolic mask”, hence:
Ap = {p1, p2, .....pn}
These properties could therefore determine the inferred expected beha-
viour which we term as “the relation of significance” with other players in 
the virtual game. This is not saying much, obviously, and we need to pur-
sue the discussion further. In particular, we will need to define the nature of 
the rules that generate and give meaning to virtual language games and al-
low players immersed in the game to infer expected behaviour. But before 
we get into the notion of rules, or the grammar of virtual games, we need to 
explain what we mean about moves in language games.
This notion is very simple, but is an important one in Wittgenstein's the-
ory. Ordinarily,  we are not in contact with language games as such,  but 
with actions performed as part of a language game: we do not see "chess", 
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but a game of chess; instead of "promise", we see a specific promise; instead 
of "novel", a particular novel; rather than "textual analysis", a particular tex-
tual analysis. In one sense, the language game is a hypothesis that we are 
making about the basis of individuals'  semiotic behaviour, assuming that 
this behaviour is not random, but a function of specific rules. Most of the 
time, then, we are in contact with actions performed in language games yet 
to be identified: these actions are what Wittgenstein calls "moves" in the lan-
guage games.
This is why in most sign production and interpretation practices, the raw 
material for a Wittgenstein-style analysis is the action, the move (or the set 
of moves), which we can trace back to the language game and its grammar. 
The text you are currently reading is a set of moves in a language game that  
we could provisionally call "introduction to a theory". The way in which se-
miotic relations operate between this text and Wittgenstein's work are dir-
ectly related to the rules of this language game. The link between moves 
and the grammar is a close one: the moves only acquire meaning by existing 
within the area of discourse and action defined and delimited by the gram-
mar. 
Further the grammar of a language game – what we have also called the 
"rules" here – is truly the keystone of Wittgenstein's theory. The rules inter-
define the elements that make up the game; they assign a role and a mean-
ing to each element, they define the game's space and time, the participants' 
functions and goals, and so on. In short, they create and give structure to an 
area of potential discourse and actions that owe their meaning to the rules. 
The rules impose their order on that portion of reality in which the game 
unfolds. 
The game's constitutive rules are the possibility condition for the actions 
performed in these games and sports, just as grammatical propositions are 
the (conceptual) possibility condition for the moves in the language games, 
therefore our language behaviours (among others) are moves in language 
games (of which we are often unaware), and they draw their meaning from 
the grammar of these games. And an analysis of them examines the moves 
in order to arrive at their grammatical possibility conditions. One of the dif-
ficulties encountered in this analysis is  our familiarity with the language 
games, which obscures the existence of the moves, even in the clearest cases 
of  games.  For  example,  when  we  "take  the  opponent's  rook  with  our 
bishop" in a chess game, we think we are dealing in raw facts; it does not 
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occur to us that these movements of objects through space can be seen as we 
see  them only if  we have integrated the interdefined concepts  of  pieces, 
movement,  chessboard,  square,  player  and capture,  to  name a  few.  The 
grammar  of  virtual  games,  some of  which  are  not  even  named,  maybe 
thought of as having a similar sort of familiar invisibility.
A similar analysis structure could unfold for actions in a virtual game 
providing us with further detail concerning activity within the virtual se-
miosphere and allowing us to formulate possibility conditions that could 
determine the “relation of significance” with other players in  the virtual 
game and shedding light on our understanding of the Proteus effect. We 
have invoked and utilised the idea of a “virtual personality” in developing 
our explanations above, at this stage it is important to detail what we mean 
by this term. 
4. VIRTUAL PERSONALITIES WITHIN SEMIOSPHERES
In what follows, we shall distinguish between "virtual identity" and "virtual 
personality". Although identity and personality are often uses as synonyms, 
it  could  be  useful  to  draw  a  distinction  (albeit  a  rather  artificial  one) 
between them. Identity is derived from identification and suggests that a 
subject identifies himself with an object or with some set of qualities. Per-
sonality, on the contrary, fixes more on the content of the entity that is per-
ceived as having qualities of the subject – whether by the subject, himself, or 
from the outside. In some cases, there can be a personality without identific-
ation – for examples, a virtual character created for attaining some special 
aim or a computer software simulating a human person. 
Both have personal  traits  but  neither  is  an object  of  identification for 
their originators. Since we are more interested in studying the construction 
of  virtual  selves  and  their  (often  ambivalent)  relationships  to  the  "real 
selves"  than  in  the  process  of  identification,  then the  term "personality” 
seems to fit better for our purposes than that of "identity".
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FIGURE 2: PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION OF THE RELATION OF 
SIGNIFICANCE
A survey of the experimental research relating to virtual personalities in-
dicates  that  both users  and researchers  of  cyberspace  communities  have 
paid attention to the following peculiarities of virtual personalities:
1. Disembodiment or incorporeality, the reduction of the personality 
to its semiotic manifestations.
2. Anonymity, or at least, the possibility of such (cf. popular aphorism 
from a newspaper caricature "On the Internet, nobody knows that 
you are a dog"), or semiotically speaking, the arbitrary connection 
between the real or "off-line" identities.
3. Freedom of providing virtual identity with any set of characteristics 
(i.e.  extended  possibilities  of  identification  usually  impossible  in 
real life).
4. Multiplicity,  the  possibility  of  maintaining  a  number  of different 
virtual identities simultaneously or successively.
5. Automation, the possibility of simulating activity of virtual identity 
fully or in part by using computer programmes (this links virtual 
personality to the concept of artificial intelligence). 
These  peculiarities  seem  to  indicate  that  virtual  personality,  created 
through the transmission of knowledge and values in virtual semiospheres, 
through education and virtual communities, through virtual remembrances, 
and through our own ideals and symbols, is viewed as more shifting, fluc-
tuating, mobile, and protean than ever. The opportunity for social interac-
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tion in virtual communities therefore creates a sense of immersion and en-
gagement different from anything that sensory or motor realism alone can 
provide.20 Personality cues are few in the virtual world; they still exist, but 
in a different ways. From a semiotic perspective, the difference between the 
look and the self is important for the construction of virtual personality, tak-
ing on a new symbolic form in the virtual world. The idea that virtual iden-
tities are divergent from identities in the real world is common sense. In-
deed, on the Internet, identity is occupied by an outside beyond itself,21 that 
is, an Other, a “self” online that cannot be denied because the very existence 
of consciousness in the real world also implies the existence of conscious-
ness in cyberspace, where the self takes on a different meaning and where 
every personality is represented rather than real. This justifies the existence 
of Otherness. Otherness dwells in identities and systems – both in their pro-
duction of meaning and in their interpretation. Personality does not exist  
without meaning and interpretation, even in cyberspace. Therefore, in order 
to play the role of the Other, one has to produce meaning and interpreta-
tion.
However when dealing with interaction between humans and machines, 
individuals are confronted with a compound system of personalities,  lan-
guage, and (visual) communication, all of which are part of a web. Goff-
man22 describes the web as a medium that represents a separation from pre-
vious modes for the presentation of self in everyday life. Geertz23 adds that 
the human being is an “animal suspended in webs of significance he, him-
self, has spun”. The virtual world is a world of opportunities for intraper-
sonal and interpersonal semiosis to occur. Given the magnetism and power 
that the Internet has on our perception and on our semiotic practice, it is ob-
vious that not only our personalities but also space and time are being mod-
ulated in the virtual world. Indeed, the traditional demarcation between im-
age, language, and writing is beginning to move in a radical way. Virtual 
environments such as the Internet have the power to create personalities  
and enable us to explore very new forms of authorship in a way that ex-
presses emergent meaning. These environments can be navigated, engender 
new forms of experience, and be modified or radically restructured. Con-
20  Schiano, 1999
21  Day, 1999
22  Goffman, 1969
23  Geertz, 1973, p.5
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sequently, our personalities begin to fluctuate or, more accurately, to float in 
that  new space,  a  virtual  semiotic  space.  As a matter  of  fact,  one of the 
unique qualities of the virtual environment is that it enables the web user to 
have a more free-floating experience of perception. In the virtual world, he 
or she might choose to occupy various positions that would not be possible 
within actual space, where the individual's identity has a physical compon-
ent.
As we have seen, virtual masks and non-disclosures of identity are part 
of the virtual grammar of cyberspace. Deception on the Internet, however, 
is not always acknowledged as such, by the receiver or the sender of the 
message. Philosophers like Turkle24 argue that human beings are not de-
ceptive  on-line  if  only  because  they  do not  really  become someone  else 
(what they actually do is split their personalities into real life and on-line 
parts. An individual's personality, she contends, “is the sum of his or her 
distributed presence”.25 
The personality no longer simply plays different roles in different set-
tings. Rather, the personality exists in many worlds and plays many roles at  
the same time. Having multiple personalities in cyberspace is not a decep-
tion but extends the range of selves that are available, what we term as the 
layering effect, as depicted by figure 3. People self-fashion and self-create. 
They “are able to build a self by cycling through many selves”.26 From this 
critical perspective, there is an extension rather than a different order of ex-
istence  because  personality  is  “something  complex  and decentered”27,  as 
well as dispersed and multiplied in continuous instability.28 This is why we 
should talk about “alterity” instead of difference. The belief that individuals 
are unitary is itself an illusion.29 
From all this, we may conclude that the boundaries between the virtual 
and the real are blurred, that cyberspace is a myth with its own reality and 
its own place (or “space”).  Myth symbolizes the relationships among hu-
man beings and “real” multiple personalities. In doing so, myth establishes 
a rapport between communication and understanding. As Barthes30 puts it 
24 Turkle, 1997
25 Turkle, 1997, p. 110
26 Turkle, 1995, p.178
27 Turkle, 1995, p. 20
28 Poster, 1990
29 Turkle, 1997
30 Barthes, 1972
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appropriately, from the beginning, myth is a communication system and a 
message.
FIGURE 3: ILLUSTRATING THE FLUIDITY OF PERSONALITY AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH LIMINAL AND LIMINOID STATES.31
Thus, with these new forms of space and time, specifically in reference to 
cyberspace, a provocative model through which to consider the process of 
personality evolution is being presented. The changes of personality begins 
to converge under the sign of the virtual environment. We enter the nature 
of the real that enables the virtual and the virtual that enables the real, per-
sonality then becomes a flux between the virtual and real depicted by our 
model, a flux or, as Rheingold suggests, a “fluid”32 in the sense that we take 
a fluid role in the construction of real and virtual personalities through dif-
ferent levels and qualities of interaction within the semiosphere and its lan-
31 The ideas presented here relating to Liminal and Liminoid states are detailed in our earlier  
paper, Cavagnetto, S., and Gahir, B., (2009). The Conception of the Self in Multiple Cyber-
worlds, paper presented at the 7th International Cyberspace Conference, Brno, Czech Re-
public.
32 Rheingold, 1998, p.84
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guage games, the Proteus effect therefore becomes a consequence of such 
fluidity within a semiosphere and since fluidity implies that something can 
be manipulated on the whims of its creator; it also implies fragmentation, a 
term of postmodern identity construction, fluidity and fragmentation there-
fore co-exist within the grammar of virtual games. While modernist concep-
tions of personality are based on the ideal of a stable, unchanging personal-
ity, post-modernism sees personality as continuously being reconstructed. 
In other words, in the construction of virtual personalities, the disembodied 
world of the Internet and cyberspace seems to be a symbol of postmodern-
ism, where many of the basic cues to personality and the social roles we are  
accustomed to in the physical world are absent. As a result, individuals lose 
their consistency, and their real lives suffer because they are living a lie and 
suspect that those with whom they communicate are also guilty of decep-
tion. In a similar vein, individuals are in contact with people from different 
cultures and with people they have met only as virtual constructs. 
Consequently, by interacting beyond the stigma of real life, it is difficult 
to determine how personality is to be projected and what role it plays in our 
grammar of virtual games. 
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper our intention has been to provide further understanding of the 
relationship between the Proteus effects and the conceptual model of mul-
tiple virtual personalities interacting in CVE using the Wittgensteinian lan-
guage games framework, we expanded upon our earlier paper to suggest 
that the notions of a “virtual personality” and “virtual game grammar” may 
hopefully bring a refreshing approach to examining the Proteus effect.
The Wittgensteinian language games framework was utilised to develop 
some of the concepts such as “virtual game grammar” and “form of virtual 
life” this was related to the ideas of “virtual semiotic domains” and “virtual  
personalities”. Our aim has been to introduce some form of initial conceptu-
al understanding of these concepts in the context of CVE's and to initiate 
further  development  towards  developing  a  formalised  model  for  virtual 
personalities.
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